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What would constitute a legitimate global order? Dirk Peters argues that current 
research on this issue is one-sided: it takes Western democracy as a universal standard 
and focuses discussion on how aspects of democracy can be applied at the global level. 
But instead of promoting a universal standard, says Peters, research needs to listen to 
the actors involved in global governance. There can be no legitimate global order 
without taking into account what these actors regard as legitimate, and this will not 
necessarily be a model based on Western democracy. This point of view is endorsed by 
Frank Gadinger, who proposes a methodological technique from sociology to facilitate 
empirical research in this area. By reconstructing the arguments that ‘ordinary actors’ 
employ in the global political arena, we can reveal what they consider legitimate. Daniel 
Gaus, by contrast, takes issue with Peters’s critique of democracy as a universal 
standard. Peters may well be correct in contending that Western democratic 
institutions are not suitable as a basis for legitimizing global politics, says Gaus, but the 
very act of listening to the governed, and making their conceptions of legitimacy the 
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Rethinking the Legitimacy of Global 
Governance: On the Need for Sociological 




Legitimacy is an increasingly prominent focus of global governance research. In 
its early days, scholarship on global governance could rightly be criticized for 
devoting excessive attention to questions of effectiveness whilst ignoring 
normative issues. Over the past decade, however, there has been a major shift in 
this situation, and literature on the legitimacy of global governance has 
mushroomed. Such research is of interest not only for normative reasons—because 
global governance institutions should be legitimate—but also on purely functional 
grounds. Considerations of legitimacy will be of vital significance in determining 
the success or failure of international cooperation; and the more legitimate the 
design and outcomes of global governance institutions are held to be, the greater 
the likely degree of compliance. Moreover, conceptions of legitimacy will play an 
important role in bringing about cooperative institutions in the first place. Where 
actors hold incompatible views as to what is legitimate, they will be hard-pressed 
to find avenues for successful cooperation. 
The idea that actors may have divergent views of what constitutes a legitimate 
institution has received surprisingly little attention in the recent wave of research. 
Most of what has been written is based on the assumption that all actors in global 
politics can, in principle, subscribe to a single set of standards of legitimacy. From 
this viewpoint, a legitimate political order looks surprisingly like a Western 
democracy. 
In this paper, I will set out some preliminary thoughts, which I hope will 
eventually—once fully developed—clear the conceptual ground for an alternative 
approach in which the potential plurality of conceptions of legitimacy is taken 
seriously. I will begin by discussing what is meant by ‘conceptions of legitimacy’ and 
by seeking to substantiate my claim, firstly, that these conceptions are important 
preconditions for the success or failure of international cooperation and, secondly, 
that actors in the international arena may differ in what they regard as legitimate. I 
will go on to show that, despite an intense debate about normative issues, global 
governance research pays insufficient attention to the potential plurality of 
notions of legitimacy. A particularly worrying feature here is the tendency of the 
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debate to focus almost exclusively on ways of transposing the concepts of Western 
democracy to the international level. Even within this narrow, ostensibly 
universalist, focus, however, the literature comes up with multiple ideas as to what 
might count as legitimate institutions. This implies a need for further investigation 
along two routes. First, there should be empirical research to establish whether 
international actors subscribe unequivocally to the principles of Western 
democracy (as global governance researchers seem to do) and—if they don’t—to 
determine what alternative sources of legitimacy may be tapped. Secondly, there 
needs to be a theoretical debate about potential zones of convergence or overlap, 
in other words about how we can bring together differing or competing 
conceptions of legitimacy in order to build a legitimate global order. I outline an 
agenda for this research in my concluding section. 
Conceptions of Legitimacy 
What is legitimacy? Given its status as a central debating-point of political analysis 
and philosophy, the concept is, predictably, ill-defined. In essence, however, it has 
to do with the normative underpinning of authoritative rules. Legitimate rules 
imply a duty to obey these rules on the part of those who are governed by them 
(Bernstein and Coleman 2009: 5–9; Reus-Smit 2007: 158–9).1 
Legitimacy is thus primarily a characteristic of rules or institutions (sets of rules). 
However, rulers (in the widest sense) and their actions can also be described as 
legitimate or illegitimate, depending on whether the rules on which their authority 
is based are legitimate. To be more precise, legitimacy is a characteristic that is 
ascribed by individuals or groups to these entities, and ‘this process of ascription is 
always norm-referential’ (Reus-Smit 2007: 162). To say that an institution etc.2 is 
legitimate is to make the judgement that it meets certain normative standards of 
legitimacy. 
It follows that to get at the substance of legitimacy (i.e. to be able to judge what 
is legitimate/illegitimate), we need to identify the normative standards in question. 
Such analyses of legitimacy can take at least two general forms. They can either 
reconstruct existing norm-sets and the judgements about institutions that real 
actors base on them. This is the sociological approach, most famously promoted by 
Max Weber and, in Beetham’s view (1991: 6), the one most commonly pursued by 
today’s social scientists: ‘What matters for an adequate understanding is not what 
they personally believe, but what is believed in the society they are studying. For 
this reason most social scientists in the twentieth century have followed Max 
Weber in defining legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy on the part of the relevant 
social agents; and power relations as legitimate where those involved in them, 
subordinate as well as dominant, believe them to be so.’ Research in this 
sociological vein can focus on simply determining whether or not actors believe an 
                                                 
1  For a defence of this 'traditional' view against more recent attempts to demonstrate that legitimacy does 
not necessarily entail political obligation, see Klosko (2007). 
2  In what follows, I refer only to institutions and orders, but these should be taken to include all potential 
subjects of legitimacy and justice. 
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institution to be legitimate (e.g. Take 2013: 51–3); or it can aim at reconstructing 
the discursive bases of these beliefs—that is to say, the social norms in which they 
are grounded and the discursive processes and practices through which they are 
brought about (see Reus-Smit 2007: 162 f.; Gadinger and Yildiz 2012; Nullmeier et 
al. 2010). 
A second approach is concerned with actually constructing norm-sets against 
which the legitimacy of institutions can be judged. Such approaches are sometimes 
labelled ‘prescriptive’ or ‘normative’. I will call them ‘philosophical’, to indicate that 
their main concern is the reasoning about the normative structures and not 
primarily their ‘empirical’ reconstruction. In these kinds of approaches, researchers 
attempt to formulate generalizable principles from which the legitimacy of any 
subject can be deduced. We will see below how global governance researchers 
have followed this path, constructing standards of legitimacy for global 
governance. 
To enjoy legitimacy is obviously of major importance to any political institution. 
This is easy to see, even at a purely functional level. If those who are subject to 
political rules feel a duty to obey them, this will contribute hugely to ensuring 
compliance. By contrast, institutions that are regarded as illegitimate will need to 
rely on coercion and will be much more difficult to sustain. In this sense, legitimacy 
‘has long-run efficiency advantages over coercion in reducing some kinds of 
enforcement costs and increasing the apparent “freedom” of subordinates’ (Hurd 
1999: 388, with additional citations; see also Koppell 2010: 66). In the case of 
institutions that are perceived as illegitimate, meanwhile: ‘their effectiveness in 
providing valuable goods may be impaired’ (Buchanan and Keohane 2006: 407). 
Sustainable international cooperation or effective global governance will therefore 
be easier to achieve if it concurs with the conceptions of legitimacy held by the 
actors participating in it. In addition, there are moral reasons for favouring 
legitimate institutions over illegitimate ones: political order simply should be 
legitimate.3 
If we take seriously the proposition that legitimacy is ascribed to institutions, 
matters immediately begin to look a little more complex. The legitimacy of an 
institution is always relative to the set of norms we apply in assessing it. Only if 
there is one uncontested common set of norms on which judgements can be based 
can we speak of legitimacy in absolute terms. This fact is of crucial importance for 
philosophical and sociological research and also in political practice. 
As far as philosophical approaches are concerned, it is a matter of first principles: 
whether one assumes a single set of norms or several possible sets of norms is a 
key decision in any philosophical theory of legitimacy. Formulating normative 
standards for legitimate institutions presupposes that you know whether to 
construct one set of such standards or be open to the possibility of a plurality. 
Sociological approaches can deal with the issue in a more relaxed fashion, as they 
can employ what I would call a ‘heuristic particularism.’ By this I mean that when 
such approaches are seeking to identify, by empirical means, the norm-sets on 
                                                 
3  From a utilitarian point of view, the functional advantages themselves constitute a moral argument in 
favour of legitimacy. 
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which actors base their judgements, they do not need to commit to a clear-cut 
perspective beforehand. They can proceed on the assumption that there may be 
multiple—perhaps even incompatible—norm-sets out there. In examining these, 
they may find that there are varying degrees of overlap, ranging from full-blown 
common normative structures to individual elements of agreement regarding 
global standards of legitimacy for political institutions. If this is the case, they will 
simply reverse the particularist assumption from which they started out. 
In terms of political practice, finally, building legitimate institutions requires a 
common normative structure of legitimacy to which all participating actors can 
subscribe. Against this background, it is obviously of major importance to know 
whether or not such a common set of norms exists. Assuming one where none 
exists may create political conflict of an overt or latent kind. In a best-case scenario, 
conflict over standards of legitimacy emerges during the institution-building phase, 
giving actors an opportunity to discuss these standards and find, or create, 
institutions that accommodate all the respective positions. In a less positive 
scenario, the conflict remains suppressed and institutions emerge which some 
regard as illegitimate and therefore end up being inefficient, ineffective, or open 
to moral question. Or it may be that conflict does emerge but cannot be resolved, 
causing institution-building to stall. By contrast, if a plurality of normative 
standards is accepted from the outset, all the actors involved have the opportunity 
to negotiate standards of legitimacy from scratch and—if this is successful—to 
create institutions which, besides being geared to problem-solving, are rooted in a 
sustainable common norm-base. 
How has global governance research dealt with these issues? My argument is that 
what global governance has essentially done is to note the pluralism of legitimacy-
claims but respond with a call for universalism. This is inadequate. What is needed 
is not a proliferation of (philosophical) attempts to construct universal standards 
on which to base the democratic legitimacy of international institutions. Rather, 
global governance research should engage in a (sociological) examination of 
legitimacy-claims in the international sphere—an examination that is guided by a 
heuristic particularism enabling researchers to detect and carefully reconstruct 
potentially incompatible conceptions of legitimacy in the international realm. Such 
a reconstruction could serve as a starting-point for identifying zones of overlap—or 
for a political debate leading to the creation of such zones. It would no longer 
simply be assumed that everyone in the international realm could subscribe to the 
same vision—namely, the internationalization of liberal democracy. In what 
follows, I will seek to substantiate these claims by taking a closer look at global 
governance research. 
The Debate About Legitimate Global Governance 
Since the first half of the 1990s, global governance has become an increasingly 
important focus of scholarly investigation. Like any emerging strand of research, 
the early literature in this area was preoccupied with making a case for the 
originality of its focus. Its key claim was framed in descriptive terms. It contended 
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that we were seeing the emergence of new forms of international cooperation—
for creating common goods and countering global bads—which were neither state-
centred nor issue-specific (in the way that mainstream theories of international 
cooperation would hold they must be). Nor, it claimed, did these new forms 
resemble hierarchical domestic governance. These contentions frequently had 
strong normative overtones: the new forms of global governance were believed to 
hold out the promise of effective solutions to the kinds of global problems to 
which more traditional forms of cooperation were seen as an inadequate response. 
Research in this area was heavily inspired by an emerging comparative-politics 
paradigm that highlighted ‘new modes of governance’ in the domestic realm, i.e. 
non-hierarchical modes of governance that included a variety of public and private 
actors (see Pierre and Peters 2000). In line with this paradigm, it focused primarily 
on the effectiveness of these forms of governance (for an overview of this phase of 
global governance research, see Messner and Nuscheler 2003). 
Although problems relating to the legitimacy of these forms of global 
governance were sometimes discussed, they did not take centre stage. In point of 
fact, the issue of legitimacy had played very little role at all in International 
Relations research up to then—most likely as a consequence of the dominance of 
interest-based approaches in this area. It was only in 1999 that Ian Hurd published a 
widely cited article in International Organization making the case that legitimacy 
could actually constitute a legitimate focus of IR research (Hurd 1999). Some voices 
in the governance literature argued explicitly that concerns about legitimacy were 
of little importance. As long as states participated in international agreements on a 
voluntary basis, they said, no state would be obliged to do anything at the 
international level to which it had not consented. Legitimacy would be guaranteed 
via a combination of state consensus and the operations of domestic institutions, 
given that states would only enter into forms of cooperation that had been 
legitimized domestically (see e.g. Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; see also Koppell 
2010: 47). 
It would be an overstatement, however, to claim that no one raised any questions 
about legitimacy. As inter-governmental cooperation extended to more and more 
issue-areas without guaranteeing adequate involvement of parliaments or the 
public at large, traditional forms of international cooperation (for which Michael 
Zürn later coined the term ‘executive multilateralism’) were seen by some as a 
threat to democracy. This threat was argued to result either from the self-
interested actions of governments themselves as they sought to weaken domestic 
constraints on their freedom of action (Moravcsik 1997; Wolf 2000) or from the 
inherent dynamics of international institutions (Habermas 1998; Bodansky 1999) 
and processes of globalization (Kaiser 1998). 
A major change in the perception of the legitimacy problem was brought about 
by real-world events. As a result, in particular, of the mass protests against the 
WTO, IMF, and G7 in Seattle, Genoa, and other cities, but also in the wake of a 
general increase in the number of protests against globalization (Rucht 2013), it 
became clear that elements of the global governance architecture were not 
acceptable to certain vocal sections of the public and were undergoing a dramatic 
crisis of legitimacy. What followed was a massive proliferation of studies into the 
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legitimacy of global governance. This new wave of research, however, has left a 
number of important issues virtually unaddressed. 
Most interestingly, the relevant literature generally regards the modalities of the 
problem of legitimacy as self-evident or analyses them in philosophical terms (see 
Nullmeier et al. 2010: 10). That is to say, problems of legitimacy are almost always 
perceived as resulting from the fact that international institutions are not meeting 
standards of democracy, or indeed are undermining democratic procedures within 
states. The aim, from this perspective, is therefore to make international 
institutions more democratic or more compatible with state-based democracy.4 
What is striking about this mainstream approach is that ‘democracy’ is treated as 
synonymous with ‘legitimacy’ and that there is rarely any attempt at a detailed 
analysis of real-life protest surrounding international institutions and 
organizations: such protest is merely perceived as a manifestation of the 
democratic problems besetting international institutions. 
That democracy equals legitimacy is taken as read in many of the texts. The two 
terms are simply lumped together and the texts then reflect on how to improve 
the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of global governance. For Andrew Moravcsik (2004: 
336), for instance, the question of whether ‘global governance [is] democratically 
legitimate, or [whether it suffers] from a “democratic deficit” [is] one of the central 
questions – perhaps the central question – in contemporary world politics.’ Some 
texts do reflect on the fact that democracy and legitimacy are not necessarily 
synonymous; and there is sometimes brief discussion of other sources of legitimacy 
such as effectiveness, expertise, or independence (e.g. Bodansky 1999: 599 f.). 
Eventually, however, even these texts home in on the task of making governance 
more legitimate by making it more democratic, citing as justification that ‘in the 
modern world, democracy has become the hallmark of legitimate government’ 
(Bodansky 1999: 612) or that ‘democracy has become widely, albeit not universally, 
accepted as the only way to legitimize political power’ (Archibugi, Koenig-
Archibugi, and Marchetti 2012: 2). Once this assumption has been made, there is 
generally no attempt to analyse the legitimacy-related issues in global governance 
in terms of the concerns of the actors involved. Instead, civil-society protests and 
the like tend to be evoked only as a way of highlighting the significance of the 
problem, whilst actual analysis of the latter takes a rather abstract form (e.g. 
Steffek 2003). The problem is seen in terms of a mismatch between democratic 
requirements and the reality of global governance. Accordingly, globalization or 
denationalization and the resulting global governance institutions are seen as 
challenging the ‘democratic principle’ of ‘congruence between social and political 
spaces’ (Zürn 2000: 188). Those affected by a political decision, say the authors in 
question, are no longer identical with those who can make the decision or who can 
hold decision-makers to account (e.g. Archibugi 2004). Overall, then, the debate 
about the legitimacy of global governance can plausibly be read as a debate about 
how to deal with global governance’s democratic deficit (see e.g. Wheatley 2011, 
2012). 
                                                 
4  Only a handful of authors argue, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the solution lies not at the 
international level but in strengthening nation states. For an overview of the arguments advanced by these 
‘new sovereigntists’, see Spiro (2000), and Goodhart and Taninchev (2011: 1048–53). 
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Whether the 'all-affected principle' (i.e. the principle that those who are affected 
by a political decision should have the power to influence it) is really the key 
principle of democracy is debatable (for critical views, see Goodhart and Taninchev 
2011; Song 2012). Even if one accepts that it is, the ease with which legitimacy and 
democracy are equated in the global governance debate is nonetheless striking. I 
consider this tendency to equation to be a problem and I do so for two reasons. 
First, democracy may not be universally accepted as the sole means of 
legitimizing power. There are other sources of legitimacy besides inclusive 
decision-making. Even in democratic states, certain authoritative decisions are 
legitimized in other ways. There are areas, for instance, in which independence can 
constitute an important standard of legitimacy, on the basis that there are some 
decisions that ought not to be made by politically accountable decision-makers. 
Some central banks, and all constitutional courts, for example, derive part of their 
legitimacy from the fact that they are independent of the political decision-making 
process. Expertise is another source of legitimacy on which these and other 
agencies can draw. Tradition, charisma, and legality are sources of legitimacy 
famously identified by Max Weber (1968: 212–301) and the first two are not easily 
squared with the idea that legitimacy equals democracy. Admittedly this list of 
possible alternative sources of legitimacy is still rooted in Western thought and 
Western historical experience, but it is already considerably broader than the range 
of options usually addressed in the discourse on the (democratic) legitimacy of 
global governance. My aim is not to endorse one or other of these potential 
sources of legitimacy. I simply want to point out that the spectrum of such sources 
is wider than the one that usually figures in global governance discussions. If global 
governance is to be legitimate, it needs to rest on sources of legitimacy that are 
acceptable to all participants. This may make the task of ensuring legitimacy for 
global governance institutions (and of analysing it) a rather difficult one: ‘The very 
fact that global governance organizations must be legitimate to constituents from 
varied backgrounds compounds the legitimacy challenge’ (Koppell 2010: 56). The 
notion that ‘democracy’, in the sense in which it figures in the global governance 
discourse, can provide a standard—in fact the only standard—acceptable to all 
such varied constituents is not self-evident.5 Whether the democratization of 
global governance will render that governance legitimate to all those affected is 
something that has to be established empirically. 
My second reason for considering the equation of legitimacy and democracy 
problematic is that simply evoking ‘democracy’ does not do much to clarify the 
issues that global governance faces in regard to legitimacy. Like legitimacy, 
democracy can be considered a contested normative structure. There are different 
theories of democracy. There are different institutional aspects to democracy. And 
there are different approaches to transposing the concepts and institutional 
elements of national democracy to the international level. It is around these issues 
that the academic debate on legitimacy in global governance revolves. Worthwhile 
as this discourse may be, it misses out a crucial step, namely ascertaining what the 
actors themselves would regard as the requirements for a legitimate order. 
                                                 
5 Despite this, and notwithstanding his own remarks, Koppell also takes the democracy shortcut to 
legitimacy by arguing that ‘the catalog of normative legitimacy demands associated with Western 
democratic practices is, for better or worse, predominant’. 
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Two key issues shape the legitimacy debate in global governance research. The 
first is the question of whether it is even possible for democracy to be transferred 
to the international level. One sceptical strand in the literature argues that certain 
basic preconditions for democracy that are in place at the national level are missing 
internationally, rendering any transfer problematic. At issue here, in particular, is 
the concept of the demos. Some argue that democracy requires a more or less 
integrated community, a demos, and that this does not exist at the international 
level, making the creation of truly democratic international institutions difficult 
(e.g. Dahl 1999; Song 2012).6 Others argue that neither the existence of such a 
community at the national level nor its necessity for democracy is self-evident. Zürn 
(2000), for instance, disaggregates the concept of the demos in order to 
demonstrate that in some national democracies some elements that characterize 
an ideal-type demos are actually missing, while at the international level some 
elements of such a demos are present. The second key issue is that of deciding 
which elements of democracy can and should be realized within global governance 
institutions. The huge variety of approaches here demonstrates that the concept of 
democracy is not without its own ambiguities when it comes to conceptual and 
institutional implications. The more abstract the democratic principles evoked, the 
more vague their institutional implications. And the more concrete the democratic 
institutions to be transferred, the more problematic their transferability. 
Some authors argue that instituting democracy at the international level requires 
turning highly abstract democratic principles into reality. Deliberative approaches 
are a case in point. The argument here is that the ‘all-affected principle’ requires 
that all stakeholders be included in a deliberative process leading to policy-
decisions based on reasoned consensus (e.g. Risse 2004; Steffek 2003, 2004; 
Wheatley 2011). While this is a highly plausible argument (from the viewpoint of 
deliberative democratic theory), it begs the question of how such a strategy is to 
be translated into a concrete set-up for global governance institutions. Risse (2004: 
311–12) identifies four key questions that need to be answered here: Who are the 
stakeholders? Who is to be included in the policy-making process? How can an 
institutional set-up ensure that deliberation takes place? and How can the question 
of trade-offs with other democratic principles (e.g. accountability) be resolved? 
These same questions apply to any proposal for enhancing the democratic 
character of global governance on the basis of abstract democratic principles. But 
the path from highly abstract discourse to concrete institutional attributes is a long 
one, with many possible turn-offs and destinations. Democratic principles such as 
that of ‘constraining power’ or ‘enabling meaningful political agency’ (Goodhart 
and Taninchev 2011) do not immediately suggest institutional solutions, given that 
‘these basic democratic imperatives . . . can be conceptualized and operationalized 
in a variety of ways’ (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011: 1060). The same holds true 
even for somewhat more concrete goals like creating a public sphere (Nanz and 
Steffek 2004) or improving accountability at the international level (Keohane and 
Nye 2003; Grant and Keohane 2005). At the other end of the spectrum we find 
extremely concrete suggestions such as the creation of a global parliament (Falk 
and Strauss 2001, 2011). These, however, immediately take us back to the question 
                                                 
6 In a similar vein, Goodhart and Taninchev (2011) argue that national democracy is based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty, which, by definition, is inapplicable at the international level. 
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of whether institutions created for a smaller, national context can simply be cloned 
in the global sphere. 
What the debate has produced is a very varied catalogue of suggestions as to 
how to adjust global governance institutions so that they are more in line with 
selected principles of democracy. None of these suggestions, however, guarantees 
that we will end up with institutions which are actually regarded as legitimate by 
the actors involved in them. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, the 
suggestions are all made from one point of view—namely that legitimate order is 
necessarily democratic. Secondly, they may have ambiguous implications as regards 
standards of legitimacy (e.g. Do we need to create transparent institutions or does 
democratic deliberation work better if it takes place behind closed doors?). And 
finally, even clear-cut individual criteria for democratic legitimacy can have 
ambiguous institutional implications (see, for instance, the different ways in which 
accountability can be institutionalized, Grant and Keohane 2005). Detailed 
architectural designs for a full-blown global democracy as presented by certain 
proponents of cosmopolitan democracy (e.g. Held 1995; Archibugi 2004; Marchetti 
2012) are therefore always contingent to a large degree on decisions made (often 
implicitly) by scholars. 
This is not a problem in and of itself. Scholars must of course be free to debate 
possible ways of achieving a legitimate global order. That said, the debate has 
developed in a way that tends to exclude the voices of those who are actually 
involved in, or affected by, global governance. And ultimately it is their judgment, 
their ascription that will be politically effective and determine the legitimacy of the 
institutions in question. 
The Way Ahead 
Legitimacy is a key characteristic of political institutions. It can be conceived of as 
something which actors ascribe on the basis of normative structures that embody 
their own standards of legitimacy. The legitimacy of international institutions is 
thus determined in discursive processes in which political actors develop and apply 
these standards. 
When debating the legitimacy of global governance, scholars predominantly use 
what I called a philosophical approach. Rather than reconstructing the normative 
orders on which political actors base their judgements, they concentrate on 
constructing their own, well-reasoned, standards. They usually take a particular 
concept of democracy as a starting-point and use this to work out the implications 
for global governance institutions.  
This leaves global governance research with a major blind-spot. Although most of 
us agree that global governance institutions face a legitimacy crisis, we know little 
about the conceptions of legitimacy that political actors bring to the table. And yet 
knowing these is of crucial importance if we are to gain a better understanding of 
the crisis itself, and devise ways of resolving it. Only if we scrutinize real-world 
standards of legitimacy can we identify areas where there is already agreement on 
the shape of legitimate institutions—or areas where international political debate 
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and international deliberation might bring about this kind of agreement. But 
studies of this kind are only slowly beginning to emerge (e.g. Hurd 2007; Nullmeier 
et al. 2010; Bernstein 2011; and some contributions in Geis, Nullmeier, and Daase 
2012). 
Ultimately what I am calling for is more research in the sociological vein, i.e. 
empirical research into actors’ conceptions of legitimacy. Methodologically, this 
kind of endeavour requires researchers to listen to the actors involved and find 
ways of reconstructing what they believe constitutes legitimate and illegitimate, 
just and unjust rule. This may be done in several ways. One is to conduct interviews 
and put the question to them directly (Take 2012, for instance, uses this as one 
indicator of what he terms ‘empirical legitimacy’). Another is to analyse discourse 
and practice in legitimation and contestation (Bernstein 2011; Nullmeier et al. 
2010; Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann 2007). Contested institutions in 
particular provide an excellent starting-point for such an investigation. They are the 
contexts in which actors will articulate most clearly what they deem problematic 
about an institution and in which they will be most explicit in their arguments 
about what form a legitimate institution should take. In recent times, it has been 
the institutions of international finance and trade that have been the major focus 
of this type of contestation. 
The type of analysis described should be performed on the basis of what I 
referred to earlier as 'heuristic particularism'. That is to say, it should be guided by 
the assumption that actors do not necessarily agree on their conceptions of what is 
legitimate or just. This does not preclude their actually agreeing, but where it is 
claimed that they do this should be on the basis of research rather than 
assumption. The philosophical approaches outlined above could make a significant 
contribution to studies of this kind. More specifically, they can provide guiding 
typologies and sensitize researchers to important issues of legitimacy. What they 
cannot do, however, is replace the sociological study of legitimacy in the global 
sphere. 
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Don’t Be Afraid to Get Your Hands Dirty: The 
Case for Researching Everyday Legitimacy  
Frank Gadinger 
 
The Right Diagnosis: A Questionable Division of Labour in Researching 
Legitimacy 
Reflecting on political legitimacy in the context of globalization is still en vogue 
across the disciplines of political science, International Relations (IR), political 
philosophy, and related areas (see e.g. Bohman 2010; Rosanvallon 2011; Clark 
2005). While such reflections are necessary to enable us to construe normative 
concepts beyond the traditional notions of liberal democracy and the nation state, 
they mask a flaw in the overall debate, namely a general lack of interest on the part 
of these disciplines in subjecting the politics of legitimation to empirical research. 
Against this background, the contribution which Dirk Peters makes to the debate in 
his leading article is particularly cogent.  He argues that IR scholars in particular are 
more interested in developing normative frameworks for a just and legitimate 
world-order than in subjecting the relevant actors’ conceptions and understanding 
of legitimacy to concrete empirical research. As a result, he concludes, the Western 
concept of liberal democracy is constantly reproduced as a normative reference-
point. I agree with Peters that, framed in this way, the debate misses out a crucial 
step—namely, ‘ascertaining what the actors themselves would regard as the 
requirements for a legitimate order’ (p. 12) — and that it can rightly be claimed 
that an exclusively ‘philosophical’ understanding of legitimacy fails to take into 
account the plurality of legitimacy claims that emerge in the multiple controversies 
of international politics. 
Peters points to a questionable division of labour between, on the one hand, a 
privileged stratum comprising ‘philosophers’ or ‘thinkers on legitimacy’, and, on the 
other, a marginalized grouping comprising ‘sociologists’ or ‘researchers on 
legitimacy’. This critique evokes the old but ongoing controversy regarding the 
main purpose of political philosophy and, following from this, the appropriate 
research methodologies to use in political science. In sum this controversy involves 
a traditional distinction between Platonists, who focus on normative conceptions 
of a good and just world and seek out universalist standards based on pure reason, 
and Aristotelians, who deny the existence of eternally valid norms based on pure 
reason and instead stress the historicity, contingency, and situational nature of all 
human action. Up to now, the Platonists (later known as Neo-Kantians) have always 
had the more positive image, being seen as noble idealists, whereas the 
Aristotelians (later known as Pragmatists) have been characterized as ‘grubby 
urchins’ with ‘dirty hands’ because of their emphasis on ‘real politics’ and on 
people’s everyday problems and practices. In his hard-hitting critique of this 
division of labour, Raymond Geuss (2008) makes a similar point to that of Peters. 
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He complains (2008: 16) that, when it comes to theorization about politics, the 
‘utterly fundamental divisions between Is and Ought, Fact and Value, or the 
Descriptive and the Normative . . . have fallen prey to a kind of fetishism’. He goes 
on to argue that this distinction is not only artificial but misleading, given the 
limited scope of this kind of ‘ethics first’ view in addressing more complex 
phenomena in politics (Geuss 2008: 9). 
There has been much discussion recently about the ‘interpretive turn’ in 
humanities and social science research.  Ignoring as it does the supposed 
distinction outlined above, it may well offer us a means of throwing off the 
straitjacket which that distinction imposes.  Most of the innovative approaches in IR 
today—in the areas of constructivism, pragmatism, practice theory, actor-network 
theory, and cultural theory—relate normative arguments to empirical research. 
From an interpretive point of view, it makes no sense to begin the research process 
with dogmatic decisions. What one must start with, rather, is problems. 
Summarizing this kind of interpretive shift in social science research, Bruno Latour 
(2005: 23) remarks that ‘the task of defining and ordering the social should be left 
to the actors themselves and not taken up by the analyst’. The critiques offered by 
Peters and Geuss fit well into this new wave of socially grounded approaches to 
research. I support the general plea which Peters makes for a sociologically 
oriented research-programme that requires researchers to ‘listen to the actors 
involved and find ways of reconstructing what they believe constitutes legitimate 
and illegitimate, just and unjust rule’. I would, however, like to go further and 
reinforce his argument by putting flesh on the bones of his rather cursorily defined 
‘sociological approaches’. In particular, he says little about the methodological 
requirements that would pertain if this kind of approach were applied to research 
on legitimacy. In attempting to plug this gap, my analysis—in contrast to Daniel 
Gaus’s more theoretical critique—will focus on methodological considerations 
within the framework of the current debate about legitimacy. 
In order properly to investigate the legitimacy claims of ‘ordinary actors’ in the 
tradition of ethno-methodology (Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman), it is not 
sufficient to track ‘public’ discourses via analysis of survey-data or make marginal 
corrections to positivist research-designs in line with functionalist understandings 
of legitimacy. What is needed, rather, is a resolutely interpretive paradigm-shift in 
the understanding and analysis of legitimacy. While some of the scholars featuring 
in the discourse do begin the process of reconstructing the patterns underlying 
legitimacy-claims (Nullmeier et al. 2010), they show no interest in the critical 
agency of ordinary citizens and do not regard the controversies that arise in 
everyday life as appropriate objects of investigation for the social sciences. 
As a way of reintroducing ethno-methodology into research on legitimacy, I 
propose turning to the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, as propounded by Luc 
Boltanski (2011) and his collaborators. With one or two exceptions (Blokker and 
Brighenti 2011; Gadinger and Yildiz 2012), this is an approach rarely mentioned in 
current debates on political legitimacy. I will argue that only a sociological 
approach to research on legitimacy—one that takes as a starting-point the 
justificatory practices and critical capacities of the agents involved—can present a 
viable framework within which to combine abstract normative thoughts on 
changing political legitimacy with sociological sensitivity to the legitimacy claims of 
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ordinary citizens in a complex world (cp. Celikates 2006: 22). Such an approach can 
make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates about how to explore the 
politics of legitimation in institutional and transnational contexts. In addition, it 
rediscovers a moral-political dimension in explaining problems of social ordering in 
terms of local and global cooperation. 
A Pragmatic Notion of Legitimacy: Applying Boltanski’s Pragmatic 
Sociology 
Pragmatic sociology, as advanced by Luc Boltanski and his colleagues, evolved 
from an internal critique of the then dominant sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. In their 
masterwork, On Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) develop a social-
theory programme which focuses on the interplay of justification and critique in 
ordinary actors’ everyday disagreements. From a pragmatic point of view, everyday 
life is not a sphere outside the political; it is the general site of the social—and the 
most interesting for analytical purposes. In situations of conflict, actors generally 
need to coordinate their action-plans to reach social agreements. But what sort of 
acquired competences, critical capacities, and moral resources do they mobilize to 
justify their actions? This simple question lies at the heart of pragmatic sociology 
and illustrates its distinct understanding of legitimacy as a contingent product of 
negotiated legitimacy-claims between actors in daily situations of conflict. 
Boltanski emphasizes the significance of uncertainty in our social interactions. It is 
the uncertainty and unease in ‘problematic situations’ (John Dewey) which drives 
actors to reach agreements through negotiated practices of justification—rather 
than simply obeying the logic of pure interest or normative expectation. Pragmatic 
sociology suggests that these kinds of conflictual situations, in which rules of 
acceptability regarding the causes of conflict are negotiated, have a significant 
impact in terms of social change. 
What implications does this kind of pragmatic notion of legitimacy have in terms 
of research methodology? To begin with, it means taking seriously the much-
quoted actor-network slogan ‘Follow the actors themselves’ (Latour 2005: 12)—
often misunderstood as a straightforward imperative to engage in participant 
observation. And this in turn implies learning to ‘avoid ontological claims which are 
not empirically found’ (Bueger 2013) and instead listening carefully to the 
legitimacy claims articulated by ordinary actors. From a pragmatic point of view, 
‘social practices cannot be understood from an objective standpoint alone, because 
they are internally related to the interpretations and self-images of their 
participants that can only be grasped if one takes their perspective as fundamental’ 
(Celikates 2006: 21). When it comes to legitimacy, this kind of research-perspective 
is still absent from the current debate. Pragmatic sociology differs from discursive 
approaches in that 1) it provides an analytical tool for revealing the practices of 
justification and critique employed in concrete situations and 2) it adopts a 
‘pragmatic actor’ model. The following passage from Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 
37) illustrates their approach to the politics of legitimation in everyday life: 
How can a social science hope to succeed if it deliberately neglects a 
fundamental property of its object and ignores the fact that persons face 
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an obligation to answer for their behavior, evidence in hand, to other 
people with whom they interact? It suffices to be attentive . . . to the 
justifications that people develop, in speech and in action, to see that the 
social sciences must begin to take this phenomenon into account, must 
reckon with the fact that the ordinary course of life demands nearly 
constant efforts to maintain or salvage situations that are falling into 
disarray by restoring them to order. In everyday life, people never 
completely suppress their anxieties, and, like scientists, ordinary people 
never stop suspecting, wondering, and submitting the world to tests. 
This passage also points to the moral dimension present in the pragmatic 
approach to legitimacy. People involved in day-to-day struggles over legitimacy are 
subject to an imperative to justify their stance; they are endowed with critical 
capacities, moral resources, and a normal sense of justice. Struggles over legitimacy 
can be viewed as ‘tests’ or ‘trials of strength’, in which actors negotiate over their 
mutual claims to legitimacy and test the ‘worth’ of these en situation. Yet no one 
has the overall capacity to resolve the uncertainty and unease in a situation of 
conflict. It is therefore not sufficient simply to articulate personal points of view of 
the type ‘I do not agree with you because I do not like your face’ (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999: 360). Instead, people ‘[make] their demands, [denounce] injustices, 
[produce] evidence in support of their complaints, or [construct] arguments to 
justify themselves in the face of the critiques to which they are themselves 
subjected’ (Boltanski 2011: 27). If we adopt a ‘pragmatic actor’ model of this kind, 
we must conceive of actors as endowed with an ability to differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate ways of rendering criticism and justification. It is this 
competence that characterizes the normal sense of justice which people bring to 
their disputes (cp. Boltanski and Thévenot 1999: 364). As a result, what counts as a 
justification in a specific situation cannot be strategically controlled. In situations 
where people are constrained to provide a justification, they have to base their 
stance on a normative order or a higher moral principle. Pragmatic sociology argues 
that when regulating their mutual normative expectations in a dispute, actors need 
to mobilize higher moral principles that accord with public interest (not self-
interest). Relating a claim of legitimacy to a higher moral principle makes it easier 
for those involved in the interaction to accept defeat, agree on a compromise, or 
demand more evidence (cp. Celikates 2006: 34). 
What makes pragmatic sociology’s approach interesting from the perspective of 
political science research on legitimacy is its distinct view of situations of conflict as 
struggles over legitimacy. Boltanski uses the term ‘test’ to describe the contingent 
production of legitimacy in controversial situations. Thus every legitimacy struggle 
is a ‘test of strength’ (Boltanski 2011: 29) which touches on the rules of justice and 
the power of institutions. Compromise is not an inherent part of the process of 
constructing orders of worth.  As a result, when this kind of struggle over 
legitimacy is evolving, it is uncertain whether agreement will be reached. ‘It 
happens in action,’ as Peter Wagner (1999: 343) points out, ‘in the dispute over 
which criteria to mobilize for the evaluation of a situation.’ Pragmatic sociology’s 
initial suggestion of using a framework of six orders of worth, sufficient to describe 
most practices of justification, should not be misunderstood as apodictic. The 
framework does indeed provide a good methodological entry-point to the study of 
legitimacy-struggles between ordinary actors. However, it also allows compromise 
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between different orders of worth (the development of a project-based order in 
the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) is a case in point) and it 
is possible for new orders of worth (such as the ecological one in present-day 
society) to emerge. Pragmatic sociology forces us to think about the social impact 
of everyday struggles over legitimacy and why these controversies often have such 
an inflexible character. Even within a community such as a football club, a research 
group, a body of teachers, or a trade union, securing agreements that are accepted 
as legitimate is a hard task. Everywhere we look, rank and position need to be 
negotiated. Who do we accept as a legitimate team-captain, trade union leader, or 
head of a financial authority? Besides having significance in personnel terms, these 
kinds of questions highlight areas where politics of legitimation (and orders of 
worth) take conflicting forms. Should someone highly placed in what Boltanski 
terms the commercial or civic world be allowed to supervise banking? Should 
university reform be shaped by market criteria or by considerations of creativity? 
Who is the ‘right person’ to conduct negotiations on climate policy—an 
experienced politician, a scientist, or an environmental activist? In modern 
societies, people are forced to combine different orders of worth and switch 
between them. This explains the moral dilemmas we face in our everyday practices 
as, say, consumers or working people. In most social conflicts of this kind, more 
than one normative principle can be called upon to justify something or criticize it, 
to demonstrate its legitimacy or illegitimacy. The normative tension between 
political and economic orders is only one of many contentious spheres in which 
legitimacy has to be negotiated in a complex world. 
Studying Legitimacy-conflicts: A Promising Path for Global Cooperation 
Research? 
Pragmatic sociology can provide valuable tools for analysing legitimacy-related 
conflicts in contested policy-fields such as climate change, the global financial 
crisis, or Western interventionism. It allows political scientists to reconstruct the 
normative struggles going on in these areas by studying the practices of 
justification and critique employed by the actors involved. From a pragmatic point 
of view such as this, the financial crisis, the climate-change summit, and the 
international negotiations regarding potential intervention in, say, Libya or Syria 
constitute normative discourses involving an irreducible plurality of moral 
standards from the economic, political, public, and private spheres. Boltanski would 
speak of different worlds—worlds in which we live and which require us to 
configure them as needed. Morally complex situations of this kind, in which claims 
of political legitimacy are at issue, cannot be resolved through rational 
generalization or truth-seeking. These are cases where politicians, 
environmentalists, financial analysts, human-rights activists, and ordinary citizens 
disagree as to what is the most important common good. In order to explore 
practices of justification in each contested policy-field, one can observe multiple 
sites where controversy is the order of the day: EU summits, G8 meetings, Occupy 
protests. Taking the justifications of ordinary citizens seriously does not, of course, 
mean falling for any rhetorical tricks they may engage in. ‘[Following] the actors 
themselves’ implies carefully analysing differing claims to legitimacy in their 
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situational context. In terms of outcomes, as Boltanski and Thévenot warn (2006: 
135): ‘It is important to note that no situation, however pure, can permanently 
eliminate the diversity of the contingencies whose static is maintained around the 
edges of what is in order.’ Again, one should bear in mind that agents who are 
knowledgeable, critical, and reflective are nonetheless limited in their capacity to 
calculate the ramifications of every problematic situation. Reconciling disparate 
normative principles and living, as it were, between different worlds, taxes their 
abilities. This theoretical premise of uncertainty in social interactions entails an 
absence of positive, strategic action-plans. Finally, another of the premises on 
which pragmatic sociology operates is that people who are involved in legitimacy-
conflicts and come to realize that something is amiss rarely remain silent about it.  
Wherever it might be—in garages, factory canteens, university cafés, all kinds of 
public places—people will express their discontent to each other about aspects of 
society they perceive to be unjust. The mass protests that have taken place against 
the background of the EU crisis are a case in point—one that highlights the way in 
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Universality or Diversity? The Normative Pull 
of Democracy as an Idea. A Rejoinder to Dirk 
Peters 
Daniel Gaus 
Dirk Peters makes a strong case for a new focus in the research agenda on the 
legitimacy of international institutions. It has to be acknowledged, he says, that 
there are widely divergent views on the conditions for legitimate global 
governance—not only amongst scholars but also amongst citizens across the 
world. Although it is citizens’ views that ultimately determine whether global 
institutions carry legitimacy or not, these views, he argues, are largely ignored as an 
object of enquiry. There is therefore a need, he concludes, for more cross-cultural 
empirical study of citizens’ views on international legitimacy. 
Peters identifies an important blind-spot in current empirical research on 
legitimacy. However, he bases his explanation of the shortcomings of that research 
(partly) on its relation to political theory. My own remarks pertain to this assumed 
relationship—or, more broadly, to the role of political theory in the study of the 
legitimacy of international institutions. Before I suggest an alternative perspective 
on the contribution of political theory to global research on legitimacy, let me first 
summarize the account which Peters offers of the current malaise in International 
Relations research. For Peters, the main problem afflicting legitimacy-research in 
global governance is that it adopts a universalist standpoint by silently equating 
legitimacy with democratic legitimacy. In other words, he is saying that the 
conditions for legitimate global governance are simply equated with the conditions 
for legitimacy as known in Western democracies. As Peters puts it: ‘A particularly 
worrying feature here is the tendency of the debate to focus almost exclusively on 
ways of transposing the concepts of Western democracy to the international level’ 
(p. 6). This occurs, he says, because the literature on global governance often draws 
on views of legitimacy that commonly figure in political theory, and the universalist 
view that ‘legitimacy equals democratic legitimacy equals Western democracy’ is 
one of the more common amongst these. Peters regards it as unfortunate that the 
literature on global governance should base itself on political theory here, because 
in so doing it ignores the fact that the arguments this theory advances are 
generally directed towards a different goal—namely, the construction, by 
philosophical means, of a general ideal of legitimacy, from which the shape of 
legitimate political order can then be deduced (mostly by thought-experiment). In 
this context, it is legitimate to begin by assuming universal values. However, 
maintains Peters, the aim of legitimacy-research in International Relations is a 
distinct one, driven as it is by a sociological perspective. That aim is not to construct 
norms but to ‘reconstruct existing norm-sets and the judgements about institutions 
that real actors base on them’ (p. 6). 
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In sum, and in rather overstated terms, the main point advanced by Peters is that 
global governance research should emancipate itself from political theory and 
refrain from making use of the latter’s conceptions of legitimacy. Political theory 
engages in the construction of hypothetical legitimate orders and it is therefore 
permissible for it to equate legitimacy with the Western concept of democratic 
legitimacy. By contrast, International Relations research has to be heuristically 
open to the variety of existing views on legitimacy in the real world. 
I agree with much of what Peters says. He is, I believe, correct in identifying over-
generalization as a key problem in the debate about the legitimacy of global 
politics. Use of the term ‘democracy’ is undoubtedly over-generalized: the word is 
often used synonymously with ‘liberal-representative democracy’, which in turn is 
intended to imply the kind of democratic order known in Western societies. 
However, the problem of the over-general use of the concept of democracy, or 
democratic legitimacy, should not itself be over-generalized, and my main 
objection to Peters is that he runs the risk of doing exactly this in his critique. 
Whilst (rightly) criticizing the literature on global governance for an over-
generalized use of the notion of democratic legitimacy, he himself tacitly brings to 
bear his own universalist assumptions regarding that notion. That said, whereas the 
first type of universalism, the one rejected by Peters, is indeed problematic, the 
second, his own variety, need not present a serious problem. In fact, it can be seen 
as exerting a normative pull towards a more just global order—a pull that is 
affecting Western and non-Western societies alike. 
Let me try to formulate my objection to Peters more precisely. It is true that the 
system of liberal-representative democracy known from the context of the nation-
state cannot simply be transposed to the global level. This would presuppose a 
broad global political consensus of a kind that is clearly still absent. However, it 
does not necessarily follow from this that there is no aspect at all of the concept of 
democratic legitimacy as developed in Western societies that could claim to be 
generally valid. What I want to argue, in other words, is that to reject outright the 
idea of ‘transposing the concepts of Western democracy to the international level’ 
(p. 6) is to over-generalize, because such a rejection does not differentiate between 
more and less context-dependent aspects of the concept of democratic legitimacy. 
This would appear to be a crucial problem in the debate about global legitimacy, 
which rarely distinguishes between the normative expectations attached to the 
idea of democratic legitimacy and the diversity of historical attempts to put those 
expectations into effect in the organization of politics. This distinction has an 
important consequence. Should it be the case that there is a more or less 
‘universally’ shared idea of democratic legitimacy, it does not automatically follow 
that there is one particular way of organizing global politics to accord with that 
idea. Where cultural contexts differ, similar normative expectations may bring with 
them differing assumptions as to how politics should be organized to conform to 
them. To put it in other terms: views about democratic legitimacy may exhibit 
universality and diversity at one and the same time. This is what legitimacy-
research needs to become sensitive to—and what Peters neglects. In this sense, his 
critique regarding the over-generalization of the concept of democratic legitimacy 
is only partly plausible: yes, democratic legitimacy is not necessarily tied to the 
kinds of institutional arrangements known in Western democracies; but no, this 
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does not imply that we can just drop the idea of democracy as a guiding ideal for 
how to ‘do politics’ correctly. And in fact, Peters himself tacitly links legitimacy with 
the idea of democracy: the methodology he proposes is based on the belief that to 
be able to define international legitimacy in a just way, we need to take equal 
account of the views and concerns of all those affected. 
In order to substantiate the view that there may be a universalist normative core 
to the idea of democracy—despite the fact that there is no universal institutional 
recipe for how to realize it—I will now look in more detail at some of the debates 
that feature in political theory. Whether in International Relations research or in 
political theory, analysis of democratic legitimacy is undoubtedly partly biased by 
modern liberal premises. Other voices, however, stress the rather chequered 
development of democratic thinking in Western societies and point out that talking 
about ‘Western democracy’ masks what is in fact a history of ongoing controversy. 
This controversy has several dimensions. I have already mentioned the first—
namely, that in everyday language ‘democracy’ has become a term that relates 
simultaneously to two things: on the one hand, right political practice, and on the 
other a specific set of political institutions (generally the parliamentary systems of 
Western societies). By analogy with Kenneth Dyson’s (2010) famous distinction in 
regard to the state, one may speak of democracy as both an idea and an institution. 
But the problems do not stop here. Within each subset of democracy-as-institution 
and democracy-as-idea, there has been further controversy. The understanding of 
what kind of political organization constitutes a democracy is constantly changing. 
It has ranged from the direct democracy of the Greek agora through representative 
parliamentary democracy to today’s notions of a ‘counter-democracy’ (Rosanvallon 
2008) or ‘monitoring democracy’ (Keane 2009) that see national and transnational 
regulatory agencies as a necessary institutional counterweight to the shortcomings 
of majority rule. The same goes for democracy as an idea. In the course of 
numerous struggles for recognition (Honeth 1996), application of the term has 
steadily extended. As a result, there has also been a continuous broadening not 
only of democracy’s constituencies but also of the issues it deals with. The circle of 
those authorized to raise claims in a democracy has gradually extended from a 
section of society comprising only free, white, property-owning males to today’s 
wide compass where only children are legitimately excluded from political 
participation (and even the representation of animals is under discussion) (Latour 
2004; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2012). Similarly, the range of issues to be dealt with 
democratically has gradually extended, with an associated shift of the boundary 
between public and private—as epitomized in the slogan ‘The private is political’. 
It is important to note that all these developments have taken place within the 
Western political tradition. To talk of ‘Western democracy’ is therefore misleading; 
it is more appropriate to think of democracy as a constantly moving target. The 
interesting thing, however, is that it should have remained a target at all, through 
all the ups and downs of history. For John Dunn (2006), this is the main puzzle of 
the story of democracy; and what explains this puzzle, he says, is a continuity lying 
at the heart of the idea of democracy. I alluded earlier to the historical struggles 
about how best to realize democracy. Throughout all these, the idea of democracy 
was strongly associated with the idea of political equality. The unchanged core of 
the concept of democratic legitimacy may be understood as a specific conviction: 
Gaus: Universality or Diversity? The Normative Pull of Democracy as an Idea 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 2  28 
the conviction that to be able to regulate social affairs in a just way, we need to 
take equal account of the views and concerns of all those affected. 
It is important to note that, even if we accept this as the core idea of democracy, 
the idea itself offers no clue as to the institutional conditions needed for its 
realization. This will obviously depend on historical context. Differing historical 
contexts will throw up differing views as to who makes up democratic society (and 
is therefore authorized to make claims), what ‘equality’ means, which institutions 
put that equality into practice, and so on. Nonetheless, the core idea provides an 
answer to the question of how all these problems are to be resolved if outcomes 
are to be accepted as legitimate: differences must be settled by taking equal 
account of the views and concerns of all those affected. 
From this perspective, the core idea of democracy is a negative, critical one: it 
stipulates the minimum criteria that any political order has to fulfil in order to 
qualify as democratically legitimate. If we assume that this core essentially 
constitutes a ‘universal’ basis of democracy, this may help us explain a rather 
astonishing phenomenon—namely, that although there are countless competing 
views about what makes an order democratic, and although the history of 
democracy is rife with examples of exclusion and injustice, the idea of democracy 
appears to be spreading across the globe and to be continuing to exert an 
emancipatory power (Sen 1999)—as recently demonstrated by the Arab Spring. 
If we distinguish, as I have suggested, between the idea of democracy and the 
conditions required to realize it in our given historical context, then the co-
existence of views that see democracy as universal and views that stress the need 
to acknowledge diversity is not necessarily an impossibility. Seen in this light, my 
brief rejoinder to the important argument set out by Peters will, I hope, become 
more intelligible. I began by stating that, whilst criticizing the International 
Relations literature for equating legitimacy with democratic legitimacy and thus 
taking a universalist standpoint, Peters himself tacitly makes the same equation. 
We can now see more clearly why this is so. 
Peters highlights the fact that the conditions for realizing democracy at the 
global level differ from those that apply in democratic nation-states. Therefore, so 
he rightly argues, the concepts and structures around which democracy has been 
institutionally organized at the national level cannot simply be transposed to the 
global level. However, the alternative which Peters proposes for global governance 
research appears to be motivated by precisely the idea of democratic legitimacy 
outlined above. What is required, as far as Peters is concerned, is the inclusion of 
‘the, or affected by, global governance. And ultimately it is their judgment, their 
ascription that will be politically effective and determine the legitimacy of the 
institutions in question.’ (p. 13). Meaningful enquiry into the conditions for a 
legitimate global order therefore presupposes the inclusion, on an equal footing, 
of the views of those affected by that order. This point is undoubtedly a valid one. 
However, one is tempted to point out that this requirement only arises because the 
very same idea that fuelled the development of Western democratic states is now 
prompting us to extend the principle of political equality beyond the national 
(Fraser 2008). 
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In this sense, then, the criticisms which Peters advances regarding an over-
general use of the concept of democratic legitimacy are both right and not-so-
right. One condition for arriving at a legitimate definition of the terms of global 
governance is to refrain from presupposing the institutions of Western democracy. 
Another condition, however, is to treat the views of all concerned in a way that 
ensures them an equal say in that definition—in other words, to treat them 
democratically. The same idea of democracy that shaped the struggles for 
recognition in the history of Western democracies is now exerting a normative pull 
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